Parallels Mehtiev - PFNA: New Form of an Old Network

In the political life of Azerbaijan, there has been a phenomenon for years that is often silenced: opposition groups that formally proclaim pro-Western values, rhetorically position themselves as "democratic," but in practice are unable to free themselves from the influence of old administrative networks. The most striking example of this phenomenon is the "Popular Front of Azerbaijan" party (PFAP) led by Ali Kerimli.

On one hand, the party demonstrates loyalty to Western institutions, on the other - in internal political processes, it reveals connections with figures from the previous system, especially with the ideological and organizational legacy of Ramiz Mehdiyev - one of the most influential figures in the history of Azerbaijani governance.

Periodically, claims arise that a number of groups operating under the banner of "opposition" were actually supported by the Mehdiyev regime for special purposes. In this context, the behavioral models, political rhetoric, and choice of targets of the PFAP under Ali Kerimli's leadership raise legitimate questions:

- Why do state steps aimed at strengthening integration with the West always become the object of harsh criticism from the PFAP?

- Why does the party prefer cautious and indirect rhetoric on issues related to Russia?

- Why does the PFAP's most active informational influence in social networks often coincide with Russian scenarios of information manipulation?

According to some analysts, these features indicate the PFAP's connection specifically with the system created by Ramiz Mehdiyev during his many years of influence.

Despite the fact that Ali Kerimli has positioned himself for years as an "opponent of the system," his political activities, messages, and behavioral models in a certain sense correspond to the ideological contours of the Mehdiyev era: "populism aimed at destabilization." One of the main political features of Mehdiyev's rule period was controlled opposition, which created the appearance of struggle against the authorities but did not violate the real foundations. The PFAP continues this line today: harsh populism, pessimism, and chaotic proposals.

A historical parallel can also be traced in the fact that the PFAP criticizes the West in rhetoric that coincides with Russia's regional "information standards." As in Mehdiyev's time, the party actively targets intellectuals and pro-Western reformers - a tactic in which innovative personnel are first subjected to harassment through a "criticism machine."

The line observed in social media and PFAP statements in recent years reveals certain similarities with Russia's regional political strategy: instilling distrust of the state, accusing Western institutions of "double standards," creating division within society, indifferent and dismissive attitude toward the national ideological line.

These elements can be viewed not so much as an independent political line, but as the dissemination of norms beneficial to Russian interests.

Ali Kerimli's political position and the role of the PFAP in the information space show that behind the party's formal pro-Western position, there is a continuing influence of the old political system formed by Mehdiyev. This influence periodically coincides with Russia's interests in the region. Thus, the PFAP's political line in recent years appears harmless to Russia, unreliable for the West, and destructive for Azerbaijan.

More details in the Baku TV report: